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IAC-D-97
18 August 1955

IAC TASK FORCE
ON PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL
PROPOSED TERMS OF REFERENCE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The IAC asked the Task Force to study US intelligence requirements and implications of any program designed to implement the President's proposal for a US-Soviet exchange of military blueprints and aerial inspection.

The President's Proposal

"I propose, therefore, that we take a practical step, that we begin an arrangement, very quickly, as between ourselves -- immediately. These steps would include:

"To give to each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments, from beginning to end, from one end of our countries to the other, lay out the establishments and provide the blueprints to each other.

"Next, to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photography to the other country -- we to provide you the facilities within our country, ample facilities for aerial reconnaissance, where you can make all the pictures you choose and take them to your own country to study, you to provide exactly the same facilities for us and we to make these examinations and by this step convince the world that we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and relaxing tension."

2. The President's proposal falls under the general heading of "security," as opposed to disarmament; more specifically under the

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heading of "military security," security of the nation against military attack by the USSR. More specifically still, the President's proposal aims at providing against the element of surprise in the event of attack or as he stated, "great surprise attack." The President's proposal would superimpose on existing means of intelligence collection a method which would provide evidence from direct observation, although limited by the media themselves.

3. It is noted that the President's proposal calls for the exchange of a "complete blueprint of our military establishments," and for "aerial reconnaissance" which appears to be restricted to aerial photography. Since such limitation may be more implied than intended, the task force proposes to consider other means of inspection as well.

4. "Great surprise attack" is interpreted to mean any surprise attack which would jeopardize the basic strengths and interests of the United States. (Minor border clashes or incidents would not be included.) Such an attack would involve direct assault to the full extent of Soviet military capabilities, including the use of mass destruction weapons (atomic, biological and/or chemical).

5. The President's proposal calls for a bilateral arrangement between the US and the USSR in order to "convince the world that we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of great surprise attack." Because one cannot separate US security realistically from intelligence of Soviet-controlled and closely allied areas and because one cannot separate US security realistically from that of allied powers, especially those wherein US forward bases are located, the IAC believes that the areas to be inspected may go beyond continental limits of the US and the USSR.

II. DEFINITION OF THE INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM

To develop the intelligence requirements necessary to insure the US against a surprise attack by the USSR and to analyze the possibility of their satisfaction under any conditions for exchange of information and any conditions for mutual inspection.

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a. Method of Procedure: First to establish the requirements and then to define the media, if possible, in such fashion as to provide information constituting an acceptable minimum of protection against surprise attack.

b. The requirements should be developed and organized in a manner which will cover: first, the strictest interpretation of the proposal, viz. surprise attack from the USSR proper against the US proper; second, successively broader interpretations which would (1) expand the area from which surprise attack could be launched to include Soviet allied and satellite territory, (2) expand the target of attack to include US forward bases and US allies, and (3) provide for protection against the secret development of relatively greater Soviet military capabilities.

III. ASSUMPTIONS

It is assumed that:

a. The Soviet Union accepts the President's proposal.

b. The Task Force is not concerned with the various contingencies that will arise in the course of negotiations, but only with the determination of those intelligence requirements and the conditions for their satisfaction adequate to insure advance knowledge of preparations for attack.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Intelligence Requirements

1. Inasmuch as this section of the study goes to the heart of our military intelligence problem with respect to the Communist power, it is proposed that each service develop its own lists in accordance with II (2) above, and that these lists then be consolidated under the appropriate headings. As for example, the first list:

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